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Mobile Privacy and Business-toPlatform Dependencies: An
Analysis of SEC Disclosures
RONAN Ó FATHAIGH, JORIS VAN HOBOKEN & NICO VAN EIJK*
This Article systematically examines the dependence of mobile
apps on mobile platforms for the collection and use of personal
information through an analysis of Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings of mobile app companies. The
Article uses these disclosures to find systematic evidence of
how app business models are shaped by the governance of user
data by mobile platforms, in order to reflect on the role of
platforms in privacy regulation more generally. The analysis
of SEC filings documented in the Article produces new and
unique insights into the data practices and data-related
aspects of the business models of popular mobile apps and
shows the value of SEC filings for privacy law and policy
research more generally. The discussion of SEC filings and
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Professor of Law, Vrije Universiteit Brussels; and Prof. Dr. Nico van Eijk,
Professor of Information Law, and Director, Institute for Information
Law, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The authors would like
to thank the participants of the 2018 Privacy Law Scholars Conference at
the George Washington University School of Law for very helpful
comments on an earlier draft. This paper is part of a multidisciplinary
research project of the University of Amsterdam and MIT on
transparency in smartphone ecosystems, funded by the Dutch National
Science Foundation (NWO) and NSF. The project addresses the question
of how transparency requirements in data privacy law map to the
smartphone context, looking at the way in which different regulatory
environments for data privacy (E.U. and U.S.) shape transparency about
the collection and use of personal data in dominant smartphone
ecosystems (Android and Apple iOS).
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privacy builds on regulatory developments in SEC disclosures
and cybersecurity of the last decade. The Article also connects
to recent regulatory developments in the U.S. and Europe,
including the General Data Protection Regulation, the
proposals for a new ePrivacy Regulation and a Regulation of
fairness in business-to-platform relations.
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INTRODUCTION
Activision Blizzard Inc., which acquired the developer of the
Candy Crush Saga mobile application for $5.8 billion in 2016,
sounded a warning note in its February 2018 filings with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) about its
dependence on mobile platforms. Activision explained that if
these platforms, such as Apple’s App Store or the Google Play
store, “change how the personal information of consumers is
made available to developers, [its] business could be
negatively impacted.”1 Similarly, Facebook Inc., with
revenues of $40.6 billion in 2017, also warned in its SEC
1

Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 27, 2018).
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filings about its dependence on mobile platforms. Given that
nearly 90 percent of its revenue is now generated from
advertising on mobile devices, any changes by mobile
platforms which “limit [its] ability to deliver, target, or
measure” advertising on mobile devices could “adversely
affect . . . monetization on mobile devices.”2
This Article examines the dependence of mobile apps
on mobile platforms for the collection, use and monetization
of personal information. In particular, the Article explores
how app business models are shaped by the governance of
user data by mobile platforms, and what the implications
may be for the position of mobile platforms in privacy
regulation.3 Most privacy regulations in the U.S. and Europe
do not provide for specific obligations of mobile platforms,
except for a number of issued recommendations and a
provision on privacy settings in Article 10 of the recently
proposed ePrivacy Regulation in the E.U.4 In the broader
context of online platforms, the European Commission has
begun to examine business-to-platform relationships, which
is an “under-researched subject, both empirically and
theoretically.”5 This Article seeks to contribute to the
Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018).
See Daniel Greene & Katie Shilton, Platform Privacies: Governance,
Collaboration, and the Different Meanings of “Privacy” in iOS and
Android Development, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1640 (2018), available at
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817702397 (discussing the meaning of
privacy on the iOS and Android platforms); see also Katie Shilton &
Daniel Greene, Linking Platforms, Practices, and Developer Ethics:
Levers for Privacy Discourse in Mobile Application Development, J. BUS.
ETHICS (Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-0173504-8 (discussing when and how privacy conversations arise during
mobile application development).
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal
Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive
2002/58/EC, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THE
2
3
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understanding of such business-to-platform dependencies in
the mobile app environment, particularly relating to the use
of personal information.
To understand this dependence, this Article examines
the SEC filings of U.S. public companies that predominantly
operate their business, or important parts of their business,
as popular apps in the mobile app ecosystem. Our approach
is motivated by a series of initial public offerings (IPOs) by
major mobile app companies, and a number of app
acquisitions by existing public companies. Previously, many
of the companies behind the most popular mobile apps were
private companies with closed books, making a full
understanding of their data collection practices and business
models more difficult.6 However, an increasing number of
app companies are now publicly traded, and therefore subject
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934.7 They are required to make certain disclosures
to the SEC on a regular basis. In particular, companies must
disclose the most significant “risk factors” associated with a
company’s business. In the current day and age of mobile
business, these risks include aspects relating to user data
ONLINE PLATFORM ENVIRONMENT 17 (2017) (hereinafter Online Platform
Environment), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publ
ication/04c75b09-4b2b-11e7-aea8-01aa75ed71a1 (citing Néstor DuchBrown, The Competitive Landscape of Online Platforms, JRC TECHNICAL
REPORTS (2017), http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/ jrc106299.pdf);
see also Commission Inception Impact Assessment on Fairness in
Platform-to-Business Relations, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/betterregulation/initiatives/ares-2017-5222469_en (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
6 See Ilaria Liccardi et al., Improving Mobile App Selection through
Transparency and Better Permission Analysis, 5 J. PRIVACY &
CONFIDENTIALITY 1 (2013) (discussing the technical difficulties with
measuring personal information collected by mobile applications); see
also Jinyan Zang et al., Who Knows What About Me? A Survey of Behind
the Scenes Personal Data Sharing to Third Parties by Mobile Apps, TECH.
SCI. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015103001/.
7 See infra notes 49–50.
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collection, data privacy, personal information, and the role of,
and dependency on, dominant mobile platforms.8
Moreover, our approach is informed by recent
scholarship on cybersecurity disclosures in SEC filings. This
scholarship has mainly focused on the risks to consumer
privacy from data breaches,9 with some using case-study
methods to analyze SEC disclosures on cybersecurity,10 while
others have engaged in empirical longitudinal analysis of
SEC disclosures on cybersecurity.11 Privacy scholars have not
yet examined SEC disclosures concerning data privacy in
mobile app ecosystems. Considering the growing business
and financial market implications of privacy governance and
regulation,12 which the SEC has also recognized,13 we believe
See infra notes 11–12 (discussing issues like data privacy and breaches
of that privacy).
9 See Joel Bronstein, The Balance Between Informing Investors and
Protecting Companies: A Look at the Division of Corporation Finance's
Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements, 13 N.C. J.L.
& TECH. ONLINE EDITION 257 (2012); Sam Young, Comment,
Contemplating Corporate Disclosure Obligations Arising from
Cybersecurity Breaches, 38 J. CORP. L. 659 (2013); Mathew F. Ferraro,
Groundbreaking or Broken? An Analysis of SEC Cybersecurity Disclosure
Guidance, Its Effectiveness, and Implications, 77 ALB. L. REV. 297 (2014);
Norah C. Avellan, Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Growing Need for Cybersecurity in Modern Corporate America, 54
WASHBURN L.J. 193 (2014); and Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia,
Cybersecurity: Should the SEC Be Sticking Its Nose Under This Tent?,
2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35 (2016).
10 See Ferraro, supra note 9, at 324–35.
11 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
Corporate Information Security and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 129, 173-82 (2005).
12 See, e.g., Federica Cocco, Facebook Slides 4% after Cambridge Analytica
Revelations, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/
66db1ee2-2b57-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381.
13 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cybersecurity, (Sept. 20,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-20
17-09-20 (“Data collection, storage, analysis, availability and protection
(including security, validation and recovery) have become fundamental to
8
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SEC disclosure analysis has become an important additional
source of information for privacy research (and practice). By
analyzing the SEC filings of a select number of public app
companies in view of our research question on the
relationship between apps and mobile platforms, we also
provide evidence on the value of these privacy governance
and risk disclosures in SEC filings for privacy research more
generally.
The Article is divided into the following sections: Part
I introduces the issues relating to privacy in mobile
ecosystems, and the current literature on privacy regulation
in mobile platforms. Part II then describes and discusses the
study undertaken to examine the SEC filings of a set of U.S.
public companies that predominantly operate their business,
or important parts of their business, as popular apps in the
mobile app ecosystem. Finally, Part III provides a discussion
on the value of SEC filings for understanding the dependence
of mobile apps on mobile platforms for the collection, use and
monetization of personal information.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Mobile Privacy
Transparency is a fundamental principle in data privacy
regulation, and is particularly important in smartphone
ecosystems,14 given the unique privacy risks associated with
mobile devices and mobile applications.15 However, as
the function and performance of our capital markets, the individuals and
entities that participate in those markets, and the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.”).
14 See Joris van Hoboken et al., Transparency and Privacy in Smartphone
Eco-systems: A Comparative Perspective (May 19, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript submitted as a draft paper to PLSC Europe) (on file with
authors).
15
See FED. TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REP., MOBILE PRIVACY
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mentioned above, many of the companies behind the most
popular mobile apps have been private companies, and a full
understanding of their data collection practices and business
models has been difficult.16 While mobile app companies may
provide privacy policies to consumers, these have been found
to be vague and ambiguous in terms of setting out a
company’s data collection and use practices.17 The privacyinvasive nature of Android and iOS smartphone apps
received significant public attention through a report by the
Wall Street Journal in its influential “What They Know”
series.18 The investigation concluded that “[t]hese phones do
not keep secrets. They are sharing [...] personal data widely
and regularly.”19 Reports of regulators and studies of privacy
disclosures by mobile apps continue to find a lack of
transparency toward mobile users, ranging from a complete
lack of a privacy policy to more specific omissions in such
policies and the use of language that does not properly
communicate data processing practices.20 Effectuating
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 2, 3 (Feb. 2013);
see also Jennifer M. Urban, et al., Mobile Phones and Privacy (UC
Berkeley Public Law Research, Working Paper July 12, 2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405.
16 See Liccardi et al., supra note 6; Zang et al., supra note 6.
17 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches
between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39,
85 (2015) (discussing the ambiguity in privacy policy terms); see also Joel
R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUDIES (SPECIAL ISSUE 2) 2 (2016).
18 See Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You,
WALL ST. J., (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52748704694004576020083703574602.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 15;
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 00461/13/EN, Opinion
02/2013 on Apps on Smart Devices 27 (Feb. 27, 2013),
https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88097.pdf; EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY
FOR NETWORK & INFO. SECURITY, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN
MOBILE APPLICATIONS, A STUDY ON THE APP DEVELOPMENT ECOSYSTEM
Journal of Business & Technology Law
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transparency in the mobile context is generally accepted to
require a broader perspective than mere privacy policies.21
In the U.S. context, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has been active in the area of mobile privacy, issuing
guidance and recommendations for the industry.22 The FTC
has done so in its role of enforcer of the U.S. consumer
protection framework in relation to unfair and deceptive
business practices and the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), which has been of specific
relevance in the area of mobile apps.23 The FTC has
conducted several investigations into the privacy relevant
practices of mobile apps, for example its enforcement action
against Snapchat.24 COPPA applies when an app knowingly
TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GDPR 19-20 (Nov. 2017);
GLOBAL PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, RESULTS OF THE GLOBAL
PRIVACY SWEEP 2014 (2014), https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/
GPEN_Summary_Global_Results_2014.pdf; FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM,
FPF
MOBILE
APPS
STUDY
2
(2016),
https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/2016-FPF-Mobile-Apps-Study_final.pdf.
21 See Paula J. Bruening & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass Darkly:
From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 515
(2016).
22 See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog,
The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583,
590-604 (2014) (discussing the role of the FTC in the area of privacy law
and policy).
23 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 65016506 (2012); see also, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Two App
Developers Settle FTC Charges They Violated Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/12/two-app-developers-settle-ftc-charges-they-violated-chil
drens; Nico van Eijk et al., Unfair Commercial Practices: A
Complementary Approach to Privacy Protection, 3 EUR. DATA PROTECTION
L. REV. 325, 326 (2017).
24 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges
That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles
-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were.
AND THE
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collects and uses the personal information of children under
thirteen years of age. COPPA contains a specific provision on
notice (§ 312.4) requiring an app to provide notice and obtain
verifiable consent as soon as it collects personal information
from children. A recent technical examination of 5,855
Android apps for COPPA compliance found that a majority of
these apps were potentially in violation of COPPA as a result
of the use of third-party software development kits (SDKs).25
Europe has taken a different approach to data privacy
regulation than the U.S., anchoring protections in the
fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal
data, and maintaining a broadly applicable legal framework
for the processing of personal data by private and public
entities.26 European data privacy law, and the E.U.’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifically,27 has
become an increasingly important reference point in U.S.
data privacy discussions and practice.28 The widely discussed
GDPR contains a detailed list of transparency obligations
concerning the collection and use of personal data, including
a right to access one’s personal data in Articles 12-15.29 The
E.U.’s ePrivacy Directive contains more specific rules for the
Irwin Reyes et al., “Won’t Somebody Think of the Children?” Examining
COPPA Compliance at Scale, 3 PROC. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 63, 63
(2018).
26 See, e.g., BART VAN DER SLOOT ET AL., EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF
BIG DATA 233 (Bart van der Sloot et al. eds., 2016).
27 See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
(establishing the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC) [hereinafter General Data Protection
Regulation].
28 See, e.g., Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data Protection
Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO, (Jan. 31, 2018,
12:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-priv
acy-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/; see also Anu
Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 12, 23 (2012).
29 See supra note 27.
25
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electronic communications sector and the tracking of online
users.30 A proposal for a replacement of the Directive by a
new Regulation, including rules on privacy settings in
browser and operating system software, is under debate in
the European Parliament and the Member States.31
Reviewing the scientific literature and existing regulatory
documents discussed above, the issues at the intersection of
privacy and transparency in relation to apps and mobile
platforms can be summarized into the following four
challenges:
1. The extent to which and the conditions under
which applications (obtain) access to personal
information on users’ smartphones, including
through smartphone sensors, and sensitive
information stored on or available through the
user’s device, such as health-related or location
data.
2. The lack of transparency about the use and
associated privacy implications for mobile users,
of third party services, toolkits, libraries and
SDKs, for marketing and other purposes,
including behavioral advertising, profiling,
audience and customer analytics, fraud and
security.
3. The lack of and the challenges related to
effective transparency about the further use of
personal information, including profiling,
personalization, artificial intelligence and the
sharing of information with third parties.
4. The design of the transparency architecture by
the smartphone ecosystem, including the design
30
31

See Council Directive 2002/58/EC, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 42.
See supra note 4.
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and organization of app stores as well as the
design of privacy notifications at installation,
notifications during use of applications and the
design and availability of settings related to the
permissions given to particular applications.

B. Mobile Platforms
Governance

and

Mobile

Privacy

Mobile platforms, or perhaps better, mobile ecosystem
providers, have obtained a central role in the governance of
the collection and use of personal information and the
resolution (and creation) of specific data privacy issues. The
term mobile platform is used here to refer to the combination
of app stores and operating system of Apple (iOS) and Google
(Android), respectively, offered in the smartphone market. In
the case of Apple, the platform for the distribution of
applications and the operating system are vertically
integrated.32 In the case of Google’s Android (mobile)
operating system and Google’s platform for getting access to
applications, Google Play, the relationship between the two
is more complicated.33 In principle, Android, as an open
source operating system, is not directly managed by Google,
but by respective mobile device manufacturers, such as
Huawei or Samsung.34 There is some de facto vertical
integration as a result of non-forking agreements between
Google and device manufacturers resulting in the bundling
of specific core apps to Android operating system
installations (in particular Google Play).35
Ben Bajarin, Why Competing with Apple is So Difficult, Time,
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/01/why-competing-with-apple-is-sodifficult/.
33 See infra note 35.
34 Id.
35 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1492, Antitrust:
Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android
32
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The role of the mobile platforms is a complex one in
which the collection and use of user data and related policies
play a central role. Eaton et al. have examined the way in
which Apple has managed access to specific “boundary
resources” for application providers, including the control of
customer data and customer privacy.36 Fong has examined
the role of app intermediaries, i.e., the app stores, in
protecting data privacy, recommending that the app stores
use more of their leverage over apps to ensure respect for
data privacy principles. Specifically, Fong suggests that app
stores contractually require apps to offer users a right to
access their data and abide by other international data
privacy principles.37 There is a large and growing body of
computer science literature on mobile privacy, including
specific privacy-relevant aspects of the mobile operating
system, such as security architectures, privacy permissions
and notifications.38 In addition, user studies document the
issues faced by users in understanding the privacy risks
Operating System and Applications (Apr. 20, 2016), http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm; see also Kent Walker, THE
KEYWORD, Android: Choice at Every Turn (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/android-choice-competitionresponse-europe/.
36 Ben Eaton et al., Distributed Tuning of Boundary Resources: The Case
of Apple's iOS Service System, 39 MIS QUARTERLY 217, 231–33 (2015).
37 Adrian Fong, The Role of App Intermediaries in Protecting Data
Privacy, 25 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 85, 108 (2017).
38 See, e.g., Serge Egelman, et al., Choice Architecture and Smartphone
Privacy: There’s A Price for That, THE ECON. INFO. SECURITY & PRIVACY
211-36 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); Simon Meurer & Roland Wismüller,
APEFS: An Infrastructure for Permission-Based Filtering of Android
Apps, SECURITY & PRIVACY IN MOBILE INFO. & COMMC’N SYS. 1-11
(Andreas U. Schmidt et al. eds., 2012); Ilaria Liccardi et al., No Technical
Understanding Required: Helping Users Make Informed Choices About
Access to Their Personal Data, 2014 PROC. ACM CONF. MOBILE &
UBIQUITOUS SYS. 140, 140; Fuming Shih et al., Privacy Tipping Points in
Smartphones Privacy Preferences, 2015 PROC. ACM CONFERENCE HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMP. SYS. 807, 807; see also supra note 6.
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when using mobile platforms.39 Greene and Shilton
conducted a critical discourse analysis of privacy discussions
in Android and iOS developer forums, examining how privacy
is defined among mobile application developers, and how
mobile platforms, through technical or regulatory means,
shape these definitions.40 Martin and Shilton document the
importance of contextual factors for understanding mobile
users’ privacy preferences and behavior and suggest that
common practices in the mobile industry, such as harvesting
and reusing location data, images, and contact lists, do not
meet users’ privacy expectations.41 In the European context,
Loos has examined the contractual relationship between
mobile platforms, app developers and consumers.42 Scholars
have also examined the app store review from a freedom of
expression perspective.43
In view of the power of platforms over other
businesses, the European Commission has recently proposed
new rules for platforms in an E.U. regulation on fairness and
transparency for business users of online intermediation
See, e.g., Jialiu Lin et al., Expectation and Purpose: Understanding
Users' Mental Models of Mobile App Privacy Through Crowdsourcing,
2012 PROC. ACM CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING; Norman Sadeh et
al., Understanding and Capturing People's Privacy Policies in a Mobile
Social Networking Application, 13 J. PERS. & UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING
401, 402 (2009).
40 See Greene & Shilton, supra note 3 (discussing the differences in
provider’s definition of “privacy” and the ethical implications which arise
as a result).
41 Kirsten Martin & Katie Shilton, Putting Mobile Application Privacy in
Context: An Empirical Study of User Privacy Expectations for Mobile
Devices, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 200, 200, 211 (2016).
42 Marco B. Loos, Standard Terms for the use of the Apple App Store and
the Google Play Store, (Ctr. for the Study of European Contract L.,
Working Paper No. 2016-06 2016).
43 See Luis E. Hestres, App Neutrality: Apple’s App Store and Freedom of
Expression Online, 7 INT’L J. COMM. 1265, 1265 (2013).
39

Journal of Business & Technology Law

61

Mobile Privacy and Business-to-Platform Dependencies

services.44 The proposal seeks to cover app stores, and
includes rules on terms and conditions, suspension and
termination, ranking, differentiated treatment, complaint
handling, and codes of conduct.45 Notably, Article 7 of the
proposed regulation concerns information obligations with
respect to how platforms structure access to data that is
generated as a result of operating the platform.46 It provides
that mobile platforms “shall include in their terms and
conditions a description of the technical and contractual
access, or absence thereof, of business users to any personal
data or other data, or both, which business users or
consumers provide for the use of the online intermediation
services concerned or which are generated through the
provision of those services.”47 In its preparation for the
proposal, the European Commission organized workshops on
trading practices between online platforms and business,
including on data access, (re-)use and portability in the
online platforms environment.48
C. SEC Disclosures, Privacy and Information
Security
The Securities Act of 1933,49 and the Securities Exchange Act
See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business
Users of Online Intermediation Services, COM (2018) 238 final (Apr. 26,
2018).
45 Id. at arts. 3–6, 9–11.
46 Id. at art. 7.
47 Id.
48 Commission Report of an Engagement Workshop On Business-toBusiness Relationships in the Online Platforms Environment – Data
Access, (re-)use and Portability, at 1 COM (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/data-related-aspectsbusiness-platform-trading-practices-workshop-report.
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2012).
44
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of 1934,50 are the main legal instruments regulating the U.S.
securities market. The primary purpose of the Securities Act,
also known as the “truth in securities” law,51 is to ensure “full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold,” and to
“prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”52 The Securities
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to regulate the securities
market, and as the SEC states, its main purpose is to ensure
that companies publicly offering securities “tell the public the
truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling,
and the risks involved in investing.”53
In this regard, public offerings of securities will
generally require the company to file a registration
statement with the SEC.54 The registration statement, Form
S-1, includes a disclosure document termed a prospectus, and
the disclosure requirements in Form S-1 are set out in the
SEC’s Regulation S-K.55 The Form S-1 must not only include
financial information, such as determining the offering price,
but also a detailed “description of business,”56 any “pending
legal proceedings,” or “proceedings known to be contemplated
by governmental authorities.”57 Moreover, Form S-1 must
also include “risk factors,” which is a “discussion of the most
significant factors that make the offering speculative or
risky.”58 In 1998, the SEC adopted a Plain English rule for
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp (2012).
The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012).
53 What We Do, SEC (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwe
do.html.
54 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012); WHITNEY DEBEVOISE & PENNY SOMER-GREIF,
SECURITIES LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 503, 503–24 (Jean-Luc & Marcus Best eds.,
4th ed. 2005).
55 17 C.F.R. § 229.500 (2018).
56 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2018).
57 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2018).
58 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2018).
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registration statements, which included that risk factors
must be written in plain English and “avoid [. . .] ‘boilerplate’
explanations.”59 Registration statements filed are reviewed
by SEC staff, and the SEC will usually issue a comment
letter, and the issuer must respond within 30 days, and file
an amendment to the registration statement where
required.60 Notably, companies may be subject to criminal
and civil liability for “material misstatements or omissions”
in offering documents, including by SEC enforcement
action.61
In addition to filing the registration statement under
the Securities Exchange Act, companies that have registered
securities for a public offering are required to periodically file
an annual report (Form 10-K), a quarterly report (10-Q), and
to file a current report (Form 8-K) to disclose certain
“material events”62 (such as bankruptcy, or “other events,” for
example WhatsApp Inc.’s CEO leaving Facebook Inc.’s
board).63 When a company files a disclosure form with the
SEC, the disclosures must conform to the requirements
under the SEC’s Regulation S-K,64 and Regulation S-X.65 The
Form 10-K provides a comprehensive overview of the
company's business and financial condition and includes
audited financial statements, and must also include
disclosures regarding a company's business and operations,
risk factors, legal proceedings, management discussions and
analysis of financial condition and results of operations,
financial statements, disclosure controls and procedures, and
corporate governance.66 Importantly, a company’s chief
17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b)(4) (2018).
See Debevoise & Somer-Greif, supra note 54, at 505.
61 Id. at 510.
62 See Ferraro, supra note 9, at 314.
63 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Apr. 30, 2018).
64 17 C.F.R. § 229.1111(h)(4) (2018).
65 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(a)(1) (2018).
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2012).
59
60
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executive officer and chief financial officer must certify the
material accuracy and completeness of the disclosures.
In addition to the information expressly required by
SEC regulations, a company is required to disclose “such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to
make the required statements, in light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading.”67 The SEC
considers omitted information to be “material” if there is a
“substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the information important in making an investment
decision or that disclosure of the omitted information would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information available.”68
Notably, the SEC has recently adopted new guidance on
public company cybersecurity disclosures in February 2018.69
Importantly, in addition to SEC enforcement action,
which includes criminal and civil penalties, a company may
also be sued for damages over material misstatement or
omissions in disclosure documents. An example of SEC
enforcement action would be Dell Inc.’s agreement in 2010 to
pay a $100 million penalty,70 following an SEC complaint
which charged Dell Inc. and its senior executives with filing
materially false and misleading annual reports on its Forms
10-K, and materially false and misleading quarterly reports
on its Forms l0-Q.71 Indeed, in April 2018, the company
formerly known as Yahoo Inc. paid a $35 million penalty to
settle SEC charges that it filed “materially misleading”
annual and quarterly reports for failing to disclose a user
17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2018).
Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company
Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8168 (Feb. 26, 2018).
69 Id.
70 Dell, Inc., Litigation Release No. 21599, 98 SEC Docket 3272, 3376
(July 22, 2010).
71 Complaint at 45-46, SEC v. Dell, Inc., No. 10-cv-1245 (RJL) (D.D.C.
July 22, 2010).
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data breach (affecting 500 million user accounts) for nearly
two years.72 Further, an example of an investor suit would be
the class action complaint filed in Yuan v. Facebook Inc. in
March 2018 in response to the Cambridge Analytica
scandal.73 The suit alleged that Facebook Inc. violated the
Exchange Act by making “false and/or misleading
statements” in its disclosures, including failing to disclose
“Facebook violated its own purported data privacy policies by
allowing third parties to access the personal data of millions
of Facebook users without the users’ consent.”74 The class
action followed reporting by The New York Times and The
Observer of London that the voter-profiling company
Cambridge Analytica had “harvested private information
from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users
without their permission,”75 with the investors claiming to
have “suffered significant losses and damages” following the
decline in the market value of Facebook Inc.’s shares after
the revelations.76 In light of the scandal, it was reported that
the SEC had opened an investigation into whether Facebook
Altaba, Inc., Release No. 10485 at 9-11 (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10485.pdf; Press Release,
SEC, Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to
Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million (Apr.
24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71.
73 Complaint at 2, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01725 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2018).
74 Id.
75 Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultant Exploited the
Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trumpcampaign.html; Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison,
Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge
Analytica in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analyticafacebook-influence-us-election.
76 Complaint at 4, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01725 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2018).
72
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Inc. had adequately disclosed to investors the risks
associated with third parties accessing user data without
consent.77
II. A STUDY
COMPANIES

ON THE

SEC FILINGS

OF

MOBILE APP

To understand the dependence of mobile apps on mobile
platforms, we conducted a study of the SEC filings of a set of
U.S. public companies that predominantly operate their
business, or important parts of their business, as a popular
app in the mobile app environment. We constructed our
selection of popular apps developed by publicly-traded
companies on the basis of publicly available lists of top free,
paid and grossing apps in the U.S. market.78 The companies
Dave Michaels & Georgia Wells, SEC Probes Why Facebook Didn’t
Warn Sooner on Privacy Lapse, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2018, 3:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-why-facebook-didnt-warnsooner-on-privacy-lapse-1531422043.
78 See Table 1 in the article. In order to make this selection, we first
compiled a chart of popular apps for each mobile ecosystem on the basis
of publicly available lists of the top free, paid, and grossing apps that were
available in Apple’s App Store, and Google Play store, on February 20,
2018. The first app owned by a U.S. public company (or a subsidiary) from
the first list of these two charts of apps (Apple’s App Store) was selected,
e.g. Bitmoji (Snap, Inc.). Then the first app owned by another U.S. public
company (or a subsidiary) from the first list of the second of these two
charts (Google Play store) of apps was selected, e.g. Instagram (Facebook,
Inc.) was selected. This method was repeated until a list of 10 U.S. public
companies was reached. Given that a main purpose of the study was to
see whether there is a dependence by mobile apps on mobile platforms, it
was decided to examine Alphabet, Inc. and Apple, Inc. separately, and
thus both these companies are not included in the list. Further,
Amazon.com, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation were also not included, as
an examination of their SEC filings revealed their mobile apps do not
feature prominently. See also Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Feb. 2, 2018); Microsoft Corp, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 2,
2017).
77
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selected are included in Table 1, along with each company’s
IPO date.
TABLE 1: LIST OF PUBLIC COMPANIES EXAMINED
PUBLIC COMPANY

POPULAR APPS (AND OTHER
APPS OFFERED)

IPO

Snap Inc.

Snapchat, Bitmoji

2017

Facebook Inc.

Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp,
Messenger

2012

Twitter Inc.

Twitter (Periscope)

2013

Match Group Inc.

Tinder, OkCupid, PlentyOfFish

2015

Pandora Media
Group Inc.

Pandora Music, Pandora
Premium

2011

Zynga Mobile Inc.

Zynga Poker, FarmVille,

2011

Glu Mobile Inc.

Taylor Swift, Kim Kardashian

2007

Activision Blizzard
Inc.

Candy Crush Saga, Hearthstone

1993

Electronic Arts
Inc.

Star Wars: Galaxy of Heroes,
SimCity BuildIt

1989

Take-Two
Interactive
Software Inc. 79

Grand Theft Auto, Dragon City,
Monster Legends

1997

While the list of U.S. public companies for the study
captures some of the most popular and top grossing apps in
the Apple and Google mobile ecosystems, it should be noted
that focusing on U.S. public companies to examine SEC
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE INC., INVESTOR RELATIONS:
CORPORATE PROFILE, http://ir.take2games.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=86428
&p=irol-irhome (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
79
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filings means some popular mobile apps will not be covered.
First, there are successful apps developed by U.S. private
companies, such as Uber (Uber Technologies Inc.), and
Pokémon Go (Niantic Inc.). Second, there are apps developed
by non-U.S. public and private companies, such as Angry
Birds (Rovio Entertainment Oy, Finland), Super Mario Run
(Nintendo Co., Ltd., Japan), and Clash of Clans and Fortnite
(Tencent Holdings Ltd., China). Further, the study does not
examine apps by public companies that do not feature in the
top-end of app store lists of popular apps, like the NYTimes
app (The New York Times Company). Of course, some of the
private and non-US companies may at some point become
publicly-traded in the U.S., like Spotify (Spotify Technology
S.A., Luxembourg), which became a “foreign private issuer”
in March 2018.80
The next stage in the study design was selecting the
SEC filings to be examined. As mentioned above, there are
three main types of regular filings made to the SEC by public
companies, namely the annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form
10-Q, and current Form 8-K; in addition to the registration
statement (Form S-1), which is filed when a company makes
its IPO.81 The page length of these filings can be considerable.
For example, when Twitter Inc. launched its IPO in 2013, its
Form S-1 was 810 pages.82
Similarly, Twitter’s 2017 annual filing (Form 10-K)
was 115 pages, its 2017 fourth quarterly (Form 10-Q) was 75
pages, while its eight current reports in 2017 (Form 8-K)
averaged 30 pages each. Thus, to examine all filings made
Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) 52 (Feb.
28, 2018); Ben Sisario & Matt Phillips, Spotify’s Wall Street Debut Is a
Success, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/
business/media/spotifys-wall-street-debut-is-a-success.html.
81 See supra Part I.C.
82 Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://investor.twitterinc.com/node/8226/html.
80
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with the SEC would have been considerably time-consuming,
and it was therefore decided to develop the following
methodology. First, each company’s Form S-1 was examined,
as this filing contains the most elaborated business model
description, and how a company might monetize personal
information. Second, each company’s latest Form 10-K was
examined, from which we worked backwards by year,
examining each 10-K filing until 2008,83 or when the
company went public (a majority of the companies examined
went public after 2008), to see whether there had been
changes relating to mobile platform governance changes.
The SEC filings were examined with respect to four
issues: (a) the stated role of user data in the company’s
business model; (b) the stated role of data analytics in the
company’s business model; (c) the stated dependency on
mobile platforms; and (d) the stated risks associated with
privacy regulation.
A. Monetization of User Data
By examining the SEC filings across all the companies in the
study, our first result is that the monetization of user data,
and personal information in particular, is central to the
business model of all the companies. Specifically, we found
two business model variations within this monetization of
user data model. The first variation is an advertising model,
which is mainly used by Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc., Snap
Inc., and Pandora Media Inc. The second variation is an inapp purchasing model, which is mainly used by Match Group
Inc., Zynga Inc., Glu Mobile Inc., Activision Blizzard Inc.,
See Dan Rowinski, History of Mobile App Stores, READWRITE (Feb. 6,
2012),
https://readwrite.com/2012/02/06/infographic_history_of_mobile_app_sto
res/ (stating that in 2008, both Apple, Inc. (App Store) and Google, Inc.
(Android Market) opened their mobile platforms to developers).
83
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Electronic Arts Inc., and Take-Two Interactive Software Inc.
The crucial role of user data in the advertising model
comes across clearly in the SEC filings of Twitter Inc.,
Facebook Inc., Snap Inc., and Pandora Media Inc. For
example, for Twitter Inc., mobile advertising represented
nearly 90 percent of Twitter’s total advertising revenue in
2017, which was $2.4 billion.84 Twitter derives the majority
of its advertising revenues from three products, which are
Promoted Tweets, Promoted Accounts and Promoted
Trends.85 However, the key factor in this advertising
business model is that Twitter enables “our advertisers to
target an audience based on a variety of factors,” including
what Twitter calls a user’s “Interest Graph.”86 This Interest
Graph “produces a clear and real-time signal of a user’s
interests, greatly enhancing the relevance of the ads
[Twitter] can display for users and enhancing [its] targeting
capabilities for advertisers,”87 including the “location of the
user,” a user’s follow relationships, combined with a “user’s
activity on our platform, including who the user replies to,
what Tweets the user favorites or retweets, links the user
clicks,”88 and what the user tweets about. The centrality of
monetizing user data can also be recognized in Twitter’s
Form S-1, where it states that its “value proposition to
advertisers” is its “ability to target ads based on our deep
understanding of our users.”89
Similarly, Facebook Inc.’s SEC filings revealed that
88% of its revenue in 2017, totaling $40.6 billion, was
generated from advertising on mobile devices.90 Similar to
Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 42 (Feb. 23, 2018).
Id. at 13.
86 Id. at 6.
87 Id.
88 Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 103 (Oct. 3, 2013).
89 Id. at 6.
90 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 43 (Feb. 1, 2018).
84
85
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Twitter Inc., the key value for advertisers is Facebook Inc.
enabling “marketers to reach people based on a variety of
factors including age, gender, location, interests, and
behaviors,”91 in addition to a user’s “education, work history,
and specific interests that they have chosen to share with us
on Facebook or by using the Like button around the web or
on mobile devices.”92 Also similar to Twitter Inc.’s “Interest
Graph” for advertisers, Facebook Inc. emphasizes that it
enables advertisers to use a unique “Social Context” to
enhance the value of ads, which is “information that
highlights a user’s friends’ connections with a particular
brand or business.”93 Finally, Facebook Inc. emphasizes its
real-name policy to investors,94 stating that “authentic
identity is core to the user experience on Facebook and users
generally share information that reflects their real interests
and demographics, we are able to deliver ads that reach the
intended audience with higher accuracy rates compared to
online industry averages.”95
Pandora Media Inc., with its Pandora Music app, has
a similar advertising business model built upon user data,
disclosing in its SEC filings that it enables advertisers “to
target and connect with listeners based on attributes
including age, gender, zip code, and content preferences
Id. at 5.
Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).
93 Id. at 3.
94 Justin Osofsky & Todd Gage, Community Support FYI: Improving the
Names Process on Facebook, FACEBOOK, INC. (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/12/community-support-fyiimproving-the-names-process-on-facebook/. Facebook’s real-name policy
has been controversial for its impact on privacy and marginalized
communities in particular. See e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, Facebook 'Real
Name' Policy Stirs Questions Around Identity, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:52
PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/16/living/facebook-name-policy/ind
ex.html.
95 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).
91
92
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using multi-platform ad campaigns to target their
advertising messages to listeners.”96 Notably, Pandora Media
Inc. also discloses that it offers advertisers Pandora Audience
Targeting, where “advertising products have access to a set
of over 2,000 targeting segments across all of our platforms,”
including “Pandora’s inferred Spanish Speakers and Political
Preference proprietary segments . . . targeting capabilities,
which leverage listener submitted profile information,
enabling advertisers to precisely reach sought-after
consumers without needing third-party cookies.”97
Thus, the advertising business model is built upon the
ability to target users based on a variety of a user data such
as age, gender, location, interests, friends, education, work
history, and behavior. Given the centrality of user data to the
advertising business model, it is little wonder that, as
Facebook Inc. discloses, any changes which “limit our ability
to deliver or target advertising on mobile devices” could
“adversely affect” monetization on mobile devices.98
While Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc., Snap Inc., and
Pandora Media Inc. are mainly based on an advertising
model,99 the remaining companies’ business models in our
examination are predominantly based on in-app purchases,
which also include in-app purchasing of premium features
(e.g., Match Group Inc.’s dating app Tinder Plus or Tinder
Gold).100 The first relevant feature of the in-app purchasing
Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 13, 2017).
Id. at 6.
98 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 1, 2018).
99 Companies may also combine an advertising and in-app purchasing
model, such as Pandora Media, Inc., with nearly 20% of its revenue
generated from subscriptions to its premium Pandora Plus app. See
Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 52 (Feb. 16, 2017).
100 See A Guide to Tinder: Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold, TINDER
https://www.help.tinder.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004487406-TinderPlus-and-Tinder-Gold (establishing that “Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold
are in-app subscriptions offering access to premium features such as
96
97
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model is that while these apps may have a very large number
of users, only a very small percentage of users pay, and
generate the majority of revenue. For example, Glu Mobile
Inc., which develops popular gaming apps, and generating
“the majority of [its] revenue from Apple’s iOS platform,”101
discloses in its SEC filings that “the percentage of unique
paying players for [its] largest revenue-generating free-toplay games has typically been less than 2%.”102 Similarly,
Zynga Inc., which also develops popular gaming apps, had
revenues of $861 million in 2017, and 86 million monthly
active users. However, it disclosed in its SEC filings that only
2.4% of its monthly users are paying users.103 Thus, this is
flagged as a particular risk, as Zynga Inc. relies “on a small
portion of [its] total players for nearly all of our revenue.” 104
This means that in order to increase revenue, Zynga Inc.
must “attract, retain and increase the number of paying
players,” and “more effectively monetize” players, and
“attract them to [its] other games.”105 This monetization of
users is where user data and data analytics comes to the fore
in the SEC filings of these companies.
For example, Glu Mobile Inc. discloses that it makes
“significant investments” in “proprietary analytics” and
“monetization techniques” by “segmenting and learning more
about the players of each of [its] franchises and further
monetizing our highest spending and most engaged
players.”106 Thus, “[Glu Mobile aims] to connect the data,
insights and knowledge gained from [its] analytics and
Unlimited Likes, Passport to chat with singles anywhere around the
world, ... With Tinder Gold, you also get exclusive access to our Likes You
feature, which lets you see who likes you before you swipe.”).
101 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 48 (Mar. 9, 2018).
102 Id. at 21.
103 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 20, 2018).
104 Id.
105 Zynga, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 31 (July 25, 2012).
106 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Mar. 9, 2018).
Journal of Business & Technology Law

74

Ó FATHAIGH, VAN HOBOKEN, & VAN EIJK

monetization techniques” to “improve player retention and
monetization.”107 Similarly, King Digital Entertainment
PLC, which was acquired for $5.8 billion by Activision
Blizzard Inc. in 2016,108 adopts a similar data-driven strategy
to user monetization, disclosing that “[s]ophisticated
targeting has transformed player acquisition,”109 and it runs
“acquisition campaigns in a highly granular and data-driven
way.”110 King Digital Entertainment PLC states that it has
“built extensive analytics capabilities and proprietary
technology infrastructure” to support “growth and retention
of our audience through data-driven marketing and
management of our games.”111
It adds that it runs
“thousands of discrete campaigns every 24 hours, each with
individual target metrics, and all subject to the same target
return parameters.”112 In a similar vein, one of Zynga Inc.’s
stated “core strengths” is its “[s]ophisticated data analytics,”
with its “proprietary analytics and expertise in high volume
data processing,” facilitating increased “engagement by [its]
players and generate greater sales of virtual goods.”113
Thus, the in-app purchasing model, similar to the
advertising model, is built upon the ability to effectively
engage users through data-driven monetization strategies,
specifically converting non-paying users to paying users and
optimizing the income from already paying users. Notably,
companies primarily employing an in-app purchasing
strategy may also choose in the future to use their user data
sets in developing a stronger advertising model. For example,
Id.
Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 27, 2018).
109 King Digital Entertainment PLC, Registration Statement (Form F-1)
83 (Feb. 18, 2014).
110 Id. at 87.
111 Id. at 83.
112 Id. at 81.
113 Zynga, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 72 (July 1, 2011); see
also Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Feb. 20, 2018).
107
108
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while Match Group Inc. currently derives most of its revenue
“directly from users in the form of recurring subscriptions,”114
it also explains that it has the ability “to monetize through
advertising.”115 Thus, advertisers can “reach approximately
59 million” monthly users, and Match Group Inc. offers
“advertisers the ability to customize their advertisements
based on analytics [it collects] about user interests and
behavior.”116
B. Mobile Platform Dependencies
Our study finds that nine out of the ten companies whose
SEC filings we analyzed explicitly highlighted significant
dependencies on mobile platforms and associated risks
flowing from these dependencies.117 These dependencies were
not uniform. We were able to identify a variety of
dependencies on mobile platforms, including the challenge of
interoperability of apps with mobile operating systems,118
interoperability of apps with mobile device hardware,119
Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Mar. 1, 2018).
Match Group, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 4 (Oct. 16,
2015).
116 Id.
117 Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. is the only company not to note
its reliance on mobile platforms, but instead notes its reliance on video
game platforms, such as Microsoft, Inc.’s Xbox Live and the Sony
Corporation’s Sony Entertainment Network. See Take-Two Interactive
Software, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (May 24, 2017). This may be
explained by the fact that most of its revenue is derived from the “sale of
products made for video game platforms . . . .” Id.
118 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“We are
dependent on the interoperability of our products and services with
popular devices, desktop and mobile operating systems and web browsers
that we do not control.”).
119 See, e.g., Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 22, 2018)
(Snapchat depends on effectively operating with mobile hardware,
“including but not limited to mobile-device cameras.”).
114
115
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access to app marketplaces,120 visibility and ranking of app
in app marketplaces,121 mobile platforms’ in-app payment
systems,122 delivery of advertising and targeted
advertising,123 use of personal information for advertising,124
access to mobile device identifiers,125 access to personal
information of users,126 and use of data analytics software.127
Indeed, as one company states, mobile platforms govern the
“promotion, distribution, content and operation generally” of
See, e.g., Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31 (Feb 23, 2018)
(“We rely on application marketplaces, such as Apple’s App Store and
Google’s Play, to drive downloads of our mobile applications.”).
121 See, e.g., Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Feb. 26,
2018) (“We . . . compete on the basis of the presence and visibility of our
app . . . . The websites and mobile applications of our competitors may
rank higher than our . . . app . . . which could draw potential listeners
away from our service and toward those of our competitors.”).
122 See, e.g., Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 13 (Mar. 1,
2018) (“[P]urchases of these subscriptions and features are required to be
processed through the in-app payment systems provided by Apple and, to
a lesser degree, Google.”).
123 See, e.g., Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018)
(“[O]perating systems controlled by third parties increasingly contain
features that allow device users to disable functionality that allows for
the delivery of advertising on their devices.”).
124 See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining that a platform provider may “limit the
use of personal information for advertising purposes[.]”).
125 See, e.g., id. at 14 (“[W]hen Apple announced that UDID, a standard
device identifier used in some applications, was being superseded and
would no longer be supported, application developers were required to
update their apps to utilize alternative device identifiers[.]”).
126 See, e.g., Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb.
27, 2018) (explaining that “business could be negatively impacted” if
platform providers change “how the personal information of consumers is
made available to developers”).
127 See, e.g., Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 53 (Mar. 10,
2017) ) (“[W]e rely on the data analytics software that we incorporate into
our games to calculate and report the [operating metrics] of our
games[.]”).
120
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all apps on their platform.128 In the following paragraphs, we
discuss these different types of dependencies observed in the
SEC filings in more detail.
First, in relation to the advertising business model,
Facebook Inc. discloses that its monetization on mobile
devices “depends upon” mobile platform standards “that
[Facebook does] not control,” and any changes which “limit
[its] ability to deliver” or “target” advertising could
“adversely affect” monetization on mobile devices.129
Similarly, Twitter Inc. discloses its reliance on mobile
platforms, and that mobile platforms “may make changes”
such as “limit [its] use of data to provide targeted
advertising.”130 This dependency by companies adopting an
advertising business model is particularly pronounced, given
that a substantial majority of their revenue is derived from
mobile advertising; including “[s]ubstantially all” of Snap
Inc.’s revenue, such that an “inability to collect and disclose
data” or “target the appropriate audience for advertisements”
would “seriously harm our business.”131
Second, similar to the advertising model, those
companies using the in-app purchasing model also disclose
significant dependences on mobile platforms related to the
monetization of user data. For example, Zynga Inc. discloses
its reliance on Apple’s App Store and the Google Play store,
as 84% of revenue is derived from these platforms, and
revenue is generated “primarily through the sale of in-game
virtual items.”132 Mobile platforms have “broad discretion” to
change and interpret its terms of service and other policies;
and notably, if mobile platforms “change how the personal
information of its users is made available to application
Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 20, 2018).
Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018).
130 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31 (Feb. 23, 2018).
131 Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12–13 (Feb. 22, 2018).
132 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4, 6 (Feb. 20, 2018).
128
129
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developers on the platform,”133 this could, as Zynga Inc.
states, “adversely affect [its] business, financial condition or
results of operations.”134 This emphasis on changes in access
to personal information by mobile platforms is also made by
Activision Blizzard Inc. It warns that if mobile platforms
“change how the personal information of consumers is made
available to developers,” its business “could be negatively
impacted.”135
Similarly, Glu Mobile Inc.,136 Electronic Arts Inc.,137
and Match Group Inc.,138 all highlight the risks associated
with their dependence on mobile platforms, including that
Apple and Google have “significant influence over the
products and services that [they] offer on their platforms,”139
and that “Apple and Google can unilaterally change its
standard terms and conditions with no prior notice to us,”140
and have “broad discretion” to “interpret their respective
terms and conditions in ways that may limit, eliminate or
otherwise interfere with our ability to distribute our
applications through their stores.”141 As Match Group Inc.
Id. at 8.
Id.
135 Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 27,
2018).
136 See Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018)
(“Apple and Google can unilaterally change its standard terms and
conditions with no prior notice to us.”).
137 Elec. Arts, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (May 24, 2017) (Apple’s
App Store and Google’s Play Store “have significant influence over the
products and services that we offer on their platforms.”).
138 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Mar. 1, 2018)
(Apple and Google have “broad discretion” to “interpret their respective
terms and conditions in ways that may limit, eliminate or otherwise
interfere with our ability to distribute our applications through their
stores.”).
139 Elec. Arts, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (May 24, 2017).
140 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018).
141 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Mar. 1, 2018).
133
134
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ominously warns, there is “no assurance that Apple or Google
will not limit or eliminate or otherwise interfere with the
distribution of [its] applications,” and should they do so,
“[Match Group’s] business, financial condition and results of
operations could be adversely affected.”142
While the preceding paragraphs revealed the level of
dependency these companies have with regard to mobile
platforms and the governance of personal information, our
analysis of their SEC filings also reveals some of the concrete
consequences for these companies where mobile platforms
have unilaterally made changes to their platforms.
Beginning with a notable case documented by Twitter Inc. in
its filings in February 2018, it noted that because “a majority
of [Twitter’s] users access our products and services through
mobile devices,” it is “particularly dependent” on mobile
platforms “in order to deliver . . . products and services.”143 In
this regard, Twitter Inc. pointed to the detrimental impact of
a change Apple made in 2017 to its mobile browser Safari’s
integration with third-party applications including
Twitter.144 This change resulted in a “decrease of
approximately 2 million [monthly active users] who accessed
Twitter by using registered third-party applications when
those applications automatically contact [Twitter’s] servers
for regular updates without discernible user-initiated
action.”145 This statement referenced a privacy feature Apple
introduced in iOS 11 in 2017 to both its desktop and mobile
browser Safari 11.0, called Intelligent Tracking
Prevention.146 Apple’s Intelligent Tracking Prevention blocks
Id.
Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Feb. 23, 2018).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See John Wilander, Intelligent Tracking Prevention, WEBKIT (June 5,
2017), https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention. See
also Stephen Wilmot, Apple Changes Business of Selling Your Browsing
Data, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple142
143
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cross-site tracking by removing “cookies and website data for
sites with the ability to track users across-site.”147 Indeed, we
cross-referenced this effect on Twitter Inc.’s user numbers by
examining the SEC filings of the mobile advertising company
Criteo S.A.148 Criteo S.A. noted that Apple’s Intelligent
Tracking Prevention “blocks some or all third-party cookies
by default on mobile” and “makes it more difficult for thirdparty providers like Criteo to access data on Safari users.”149
Criteo S.A. disclosed that the change had a “net negative
impact” on its revenues in the third and fourth quarters of
2017 of “$1.0 million and $25 million.”150
A second notable case is related to the situation in
which mobile platforms make changes to the possibility to
use unique mobile device identifiers to track user behavior
and deliver targeted advertising. Zynga Inc. notes that
mobile platforms’ operating systems “increasingly contain
features that allow device users to disable functionality that
allows for the delivery of advertising on their devices,” and
changes-business-of-selling-your-browsing-data-1514127600.
147 What’s New in Safari, 11.0, APPLE DEVELOPER PROGRAM, (last updated
Feb. 22, 2018), https://developer.apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/
General/WhatsNewInSafari/Articles/Safari_11_0.html#//apple_ref/doc/ui
d/TP40014305-CH13-SW11 (enhancing user privacy by preventing crosssite tracking).
148 See Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2018). Criteo S.A.
is a marketing technology company with 18,000 clients worldwide, and
revenues of $2.2 billion in 2017. Id. at 1, 2. It helps “commerce companies
and brand manufacturers acquire, convert and re-engage their
customers, using shopping data, predictive technology and large
consumer reach.” Id. at 126. See also Lara O’Reilly, Ad Tech Firm Criteo
Says Apple’s New Ad Tracking Limiter Will Hit Its Revenue; Apple’s
Intelligent Tracking Prevention Feature Makes it Harder for Ad Firms to
Target Users, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/adtech-firm-criteo-says-apples-new-ad-tracking-limiter-will-hits-itsrevenue-1509549445.
149 Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Mar. 1, 2018).
150 Id. at 81.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

81

Mobile Privacy and Business-to-Platform Dependencies

discloses that if users “elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms
in greater numbers, [its] ability to deliver effective
advertising campaigns on behalf of [its] advertisers would
suffer,” and could cause “[its] business, financial condition, or
results of operations to suffer.”151 Zynga Inc. points to when
Apple announced that its unique device identifier (UDID)152
was “being superseded and would no longer be supported,
application developers were required to update their apps to
utilize alternative device identifiers such as universally
unique identifier, or, more recently, identifier-foradvertising, which simplify the process for Apple users to opt
out of behavioral targeting.”153
A third case relates to the recent controversy over the
Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018).
See App Programming Guide for iOS – Supporting User Privacy,
APPLE, INC., (last updated Mar. 27, 2017) https://developer.apple.
com/library/archive/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgra
mmingGuide/ExpectedAppBehaviors/ExpectedAppBehaviors.html#//app
le_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH3-SW2 (“If you have not already done so,
stop using the unique device identifier (UDID) provided by the
uniqueIdentifier [sic] property of the UIDevice class. That property was
deprecated in iOS 5.0, and the App Store does not accept new apps or app
updates that use that identifier.”). For a discussion on whether Google’s
equivalent Android ID is “personally identifiable information,” see
generally Ariel A. Pardee, Yershov v. Gannet: Rethinking the VPAA in the
21st Century, 69 ME. L. REV. 251 (2017); Daniel L. Macioce, PII in Context:
Video Privacy and a Factor-Based Test for Assessing Personal
Information, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 331 (2018).
153 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018). See also
Sito Mobile Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Apr. 2, 2018) (“certain
mobile devices allow users to “Limit Ad Tracking” on their devices. Like
“Do Not Track,” “Limit Ad Tracking” is a signal that is sent by particular
mobile devices when a user chooses to send such a signal. While there is
no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon receiving such
a signal, it is possible that customers, sellers, regulators, or future
legislation may dictate a response that would limit our access to data,
and consequently negatively impact the effectiveness of our solution and
the value of our services on mobile devices.”).
151
152
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use of
“loot boxes” in gaming apps,154 with Apple
consequently changing its App Store Guidelines to require
that apps “offering ‘loot boxes’ or other mechanisms that
provide randomized virtual items for purchase must disclose
the odds of receiving each type of item to customers prior to
purchase.”155 Glu Mobile Inc. noted in its March 2018 SEC
filings that “Apple updated its terms of service to require
publishers to disclose a player’s odds of winning the various
items contained within loot boxes.”156 Glu Mobile utilizes loot
boxes “in many of its current games and the games it intends
to release in 2018,”157 and is “in the process of complying with
Apple’s new rules.”158 However, it also disclosed that it did
not “currently believe that they will have a material impact
on the monetization of [its] games that utilize loot boxes.”159
Notably, Glu Mobile Inc. stated that if Apple changes its
“terms of service to include more onerous requirements or if
Apple (or Google) were to prohibit the use of loot boxes in
games distributed on its digital platform,” it would “require
[Glu Mobile] to redesign the economies of the affected games
and would likely cause [its] revenues generated from these
games to decline.”160 Similarly, Zynga Inc. highlighted the
risk of Apple’s new policy, and that it is “continuing to
evaluate how Apple will interpret this revision,” and “how
this rule may affect [its] business, operations and financial
See, e.g., Ben Kuchera, Apple Adds New Rules for Loot Boxes, Requires
Disclosure of Probabilities, POLYGON, (Dec. 21, 2014, 9:44 AM),
https://www.polygon.com/2017/12/21/16805392/loot-box-odds-rulesapple-app-store.
155 App Store Review Guidelines—Section 3.1.1 In-App Purchases, APPLE,
INC.,
https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2018).
156 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 36.
159 Id.
160 Id.
154
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results.”161 Notably Zynga Inc. flagged the risk and
uncertainty about “whether Google, Facebook and other
platform providers adopt similar rules.”162
A fourth case we documented through our analysis
concerns mobile platform making changes to rules on in-app
rewards for advertising viewing and app installs.163 A
company Glu Mobile, Inc. was specifically affected by these
rule changes; the company noted that in 2011 Apple began
prohibiting virtual currency-incented advertising offers in
games that directed users to download other applications
from Apple’s App Store in order to complete the offer.164 Glu
Mobile Inc. stated that “[t]hese offers accounted for
approximately one-third of [its] revenue during the three
months ended September 30, 2011, and [its] inability to use
such offers has negatively impacted [its] revenue.”165 In
addition, Glu Mobile Inc. also noted in its SEC filings that in
2014 “there were reports that Apple was considering
prohibiting certain types of virtual currency-incented video
advertising in games that promoted other applications
available on the Apple App Store.” 166 Glu Mobile Inc.
disclosed that “incented video advertisements generate a
meaningful percentage of [its] overall revenue, and any
prohibition of these advertisements would have had a
Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 20, 2018).
Id.
163 Jason Kincaid, Apple Clamps Down On Incentivized App Downloads,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2011) https://beta.techcrunch.com/2011/04/19/
apple-clamps-down-on-incentivized-app-downloads/. See also Sarah
Perez, Apple Begins Rejecting Apps That Offer Rewards For Video Views,
Social Sharing, TECHCRUNCH (June 9, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/
2014/06/09/apple-begins-rejecting-apps-that-offer-rewards-for-videoviews-social-sharing/.
164 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 29 (Mar. 9, 2018).
165 Id.
166 Id.
161
162
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negative impact on [its] revenue.”167
A fifth case is related to the use of certain software for
tracking advertising metrics. Glu Mobile Inc. stated that in
2014, Facebook Inc., in its capacity as a platform for
Facebook apps, had “prohibited HasOffers, whose software
development kit [Glu Mobile] had incorporated into [its]
games to track advertising metrics, from participating in
Facebook’s mobile measurement program.”168 It was stated
that Facebook asserted HasOffers violated its agreement
with Facebook.169 Glu Mobile said that it removed HasOffers’
software development kit from their games and “replaced it
with software from a new vendor, which did not adversely
impact [its] revenue or operations.”170 Notably, Glu Mobile
disclosed that any “similar changes or prohibitions in the
future, including any changes by Facebook of its advertising
platform, which [it relies] on for a majority of [its] user
acquisition activities, could negatively impact [its] revenue
or otherwise materially harm [its] business, and [Glu Mobile]
may not receive significant or any advance warning of
Id.
Id. at 22.
169 See Ben Kepes, Holy Ban Batman - Facebook Takes Privacy Seriously
And Bans Sketchy Partner, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2014, 5:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2014/02/12/holy-ban-batmanfacebook-takes-privacy-seriously-and-bans-sketchypartner/#25cfc2fb5b5b. See also Elizabeth Dwoskin & Tony Romm,
Facebook’s Rules for Accessing User Data Lured More Than Just
Cambridge
Analytica,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-rules-foraccessing-user-data-lured-more-than-just-cambridge-analytica/2018/03/
19/31f6979c-658e-43d6-a71f-afdd8bf1308b_story.html?utm_term=.b9d7
d3e0e34a (“In 2014, Facebook blocked two advertising partners,
HasOffers and Kontagent, for violating policies on retaining customer
data and failing to notify partner companies about their data collection
practices.”).
170 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018).
167
168
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such.”171
A sixth case concerns some companies that noted a
particular reliance on Facebook Inc., such as Match Group
Inc.’s Tinder app, where up until 2017, “users currently
register for (and log in to) the application exclusively through
their Facebook profiles.”172 Match Group Inc. warned that
“Facebook has broad discretion to change its terms and
conditions applicable to the use of its platform and to
interpret its terms and conditions in ways that could limit,
eliminate or otherwise interfere with [Match Group’s] ability
to use Facebook as an authentication method.”173 Relatedly,
Zynga Inc.’s filings in 2014 revealed its dependence on
Facebook Inc., noting that 75% of its revenue was derived
from Facebook users174 (in contrast to 2017, with only 12%
from Facebook, and 51% from Apple).175 Zynga Inc. stated
that its agreement “obligated [Zynga] to use Facebook
Credits as the sole in-game payment mechanism in any
games launched on [its] own social gaming network, and
entitled Facebook to retain 30% of the stated price for
transactions on [Zynga’s] network.”176 Further, Zynga Inc.
disclosed that it was “limited in [its] ability to use a Facebook
user’s friends list and Facebook’s communication channels to
promote Zynga.com,” and “Facebook amended its standard
terms of service to prohibit (i) apps on the Facebook canvas
from promoting or linking to game sites other than Facebook
and (ii) the use of emails obtained from Facebook to promote
or link to desktop web games on platforms other than
Facebook.”177 Notably, Zynga Inc. was “prohibited from crossId.
Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Feb. 28, 2017).
173 Id.
174 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 21, 2014).
175 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Feb. 20, 2018).
176 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 21, 2014).
177 Id. at 9.
171
172

Journal of Business & Technology Law

86

Ó FATHAIGH, VAN HOBOKEN, & VAN EIJK

promoting traffic to games that are offered on platforms other
than Facebook from our games on Facebook,” and it was “not
permitted to use e-mail addresses obtained from Facebook to
promote desktop web games that are not on the Facebook
platform, subject to certain limited exceptions.”178 In its
latest filings in 2018, Zynga Inc. stated its main reliance is
now on Apple Inc. and Google’s mobile platforms, generating
84% of its revenue.179
Beyond these six cases, there are a number of other
potential changes by mobile platforms that we identified that
are worth briefly listing to further demonstrate the
dependency on mobile platforms. These include platforms
imposing file size limitations, which may limit the ability of
users to download large apps in over-the-air updates,180
changing app age-ratings methodology,181 changing fees
related to the distribution of app or delivery of ads,182 and
imposing updated software requirements.183
Id.
Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Feb. 20, 2018).
180 Id. at 8 (“platforms also impose certain file size limitations, which may
limit the ability of players to download some of our larger games in overthe-air updates.”). See Sarah Perez, Apple Bumps Up the Over-the-Air
Download Limit for Apps to 150 MB, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/20/apple-bumps-up-the-the-over-the-airdownload-limit-for-apps-to-150-mb/.
181 Glu Mobile, Inc., Registration Statement (Form 424B3) 6 (Nov. 7,
2014) (“Most recently, in the second quarter of 2014, Apple changed its
game rating methodology which has resulted in all of our games that
include gun violence receiving a 17+ rating, which could potentially
negatively impact the number of people playing these “shooter” games
and the revenues we generate from these games.”).
182 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018).
183 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018) (“Apple
informed developers that beginning on February 1, 2015 all new
applications, and beginning June 1, 2015 all updates to existing
applications, submitted to the Apple App Store must include 64-bit
support. Building our games to support 64-bit development has increased
the file sizes of our games making it more difficult for players to download
178
179
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C. Privacy Regulation
We specifically analyzed the disclosures made in relation to
privacy regulations in SEC filings to document the growing
economic importance of privacy regulations and changes to
them. All the companies examined disclosed as risk factors
their compliance with laws on privacy and data protection,184
security,185
government
investigations,186
regulatory
187
enforcement actions and settlements. This flows from the
fact that, as Twitter Inc. and Facebook Inc. explicitly state,
laws on privacy, data protection, and personal information
“involve matters central to [their] business[es].”188 In this
regard, there were a number of notable disclosures that merit
highlighting.
First, a number of companies make disclosures
our games and potentially negatively impacting the number of downloads
and active users of our titles, particularly for those games where we are
unable to keep file sizes below 150 megabytes.”).
184 Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8
(May 24, 2017).
185 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 23, 2018).
186 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 1, 2018).
187 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“In March
2011, to resolve an investigation into various incidents, we entered into a
settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission, or FTC, that,
among other things, required us to establish an information security
program designed to protect non-public consumer information and also
requires that we obtain biennial independent security assessments.”).
188 Id. at 9 (“We are subject to a number of U.S. federal and state and
foreign laws and regulations that involve matters central to our business.
These laws and regulations may involve privacy, rights of publicity, data
protection[.]”). See also Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24
(Feb. 1, 2018) (“We are subject to a variety of laws and regulations in the
United States and abroad that involve matters central to our business,
including privacy, data protection and personal information, rights of
publicity, content, intellectual property, advertising, marketing,
distribution, [and] data security[.]”).
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relating to previous regulatory action taken against the
companies over privacy and user data issues, including all
three companies mainly operating an advertising business
model. For example, Snap Inc. states that in 2015, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “resolved an investigation
into some of [its] early practices by issuing a final order.”189
The order required that Snap Inc. “establish a robust privacy
program to govern how [Snap treats] user data,” and during
the “20-year term of the order, [it] must complete bi-annual
independent privacy audits.”190 It notes that violating these
orders “could subject [the company] to substantial monetary
fines and other penalties that could seriously harm [its]
business.”191 Similarly, Twitter Inc. also discloses regulatory
investigations and settlements could cause it to “change [its]
business practices in a manner materially adverse to [its]
business.”192 It gives the example of a 2011 settlement with
the FTC which “required [Twitter] to establish an
information security program designed to protect non-public
consumer information and also requires that [it] obtain
biennial independent security assessments,” with the
obligations under the settlement agreement remaining in
effect until 2031.193
Along with Snap Inc. and Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc.’s
registration statement (Form S-1), filed in February 2012,
also disclosed that it has been subject to “regulatory
investigations and settlements,” and “[it] expect[s] to
continue to be subject to such proceedings in the future,” and
which could “require [Facebook to] change [its] business
practices in a manner materially adverse to [its] business.”194
Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 22, 2018).
Id.
191 Id.
192 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Feb. 23, 2018).
193 Id.
194 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 19 (Feb. 1, 2012).
189
190
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Facebook Inc. pointed to an agreement with the FTC made
four months earlier “to resolve an investigation into various
practices by entering into a 20-year settlement agreement
that, among other things, requires [it] to establish and refine
certain practices with respect to treatment of user data and
privacy settings and also requires that [Facebook] complete
bi-annual independent privacy audits.”195 Facebook Inc.
made the same disclosure about the FTC settlement in its
Form 10-K in 2013,196 2014,197 and 2015.198 However, it did
not include this disclosure in its Form 10-K in 2016, 2017,
nor in February 2018. In March 2018, following reporting by
The New York Times and The Observer of London that a
voter-profiling company had “harvested private information
from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users
without their permission,”199 the FTC confirmed it had again
opened an investigation into Facebook Inc.’s privacy
practices.200 Then, in its Form 10-Q filed in late April 2018,201
Facebook Inc. disclosed it had become subject to FTC and
other government inquiries in the U.S., Europe, and other
jurisdictions “in connection with the misuse of certain data
by a developer that shared such data with third parties in
Id.; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC
Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing To Keep Privacy
Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumersfailing-keep.
196 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Feb. 1, 2013).
197 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Jan. 31, 2014).
198 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (Jan. 29, 2015).
199 Rosenberg et al., supra note 75; see also Cadwalladr & GrahamHarrison, supra note 75.
200 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement by the Acting Director
of FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Regarding Reported Concerns
about Facebook Privacy Practices (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2018/03/statement-acting-director-ftcsbureau-consumer-protection.
201 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 26, 2018).
195
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violation of our terms and policies,” and enforcement action
“could cause [it] to incur substantial costs, expose [it] to
unanticipated civil and criminal liability or penalties
(including substantial monetary fines), or require [it] to
change [its] business practices in a manner materially
adverse to [its] business.”202 In addition, a further risk now
arose, as Facebook Inc. had been the “subject of intense
media coverage involving the misuse of certain data by a
developer that shared such data with third parties in
violation of [Facebook’s] terms and policies,” and such
negative publicity could have an “adverse effect on the size,
engagement, and loyalty of [its] user base and result in
decreased revenue.”203
Second, all the companies disclose risks not only
associated with U.S. laws and regulations, but also foreign
laws such as the E.U.’s GDPR,204 which may “significantly
affect” their business.205 In its February 2018 filings, three
months before the E.U. law came into effect, Facebook Inc.
stated that the law “will apply to all of [its] products and
services that provide service in Europe,” and includes
“operational requirements for companies that receive or
process personal data of residents of the European Union
that are different than those currently in place.”206 Notably,
Facebook Inc. gives two examples of changes that may occur,
namely implementing “measures to change [its] service or
limit access to [its] service for minors under the age of 16 for
certain countries in Europe,” and also be “required to obtain
consent and/or offer new controls to existing and new users
in Europe before processing data for certain aspects of our
Id. at 49.
Id. at 46.
204 See supra note 27, at 5.
205 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Feb. 1, 2018).
206 Id.
202
203
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service.”207 In its accompanying call to its Form 10-Q filing in
April 2018, Facebook Inc. did indicate European monthly and
daily users “may be flat to slightly down sequentially in Q2
as a result of the GDPR roll out,” but did “not anticipate these
changes will significantly impact advertising revenue.”208
While Facebook Inc. provides some level of specificity
regarding changes as a result of the GDPR, Pandora Media
Inc. disclosed that the GDPR “will require” implementation
of “do not track” mechanisms and “requirements that users
affirmatively ‘opt-in’ to certain types of data collection and
use.”209 This could “significantly hinder [its] ability to collect
and use data relating” to users. As such, restrictions on
Pandora Media Inc.’s ability to “collect, access and harness
listener data,” or “disclose listener data or any profiles that
[it] develop[s] using such data,” could limit its ability to
stream personalized music content and offer “targeted
advertising opportunities to [its] advertising customers,”
which are “critical to the success of [its] business.”210
Third, the SEC filings reveal the relationship between
regulation and mobile platform governance. For example,
and as mentioned above, Apple changed its App Store Review
Guidelines in December 2017 concerning loot boxes. Notably,
some companies recognized that the changes made would not
“have a material impact on the monetization of [its] games
that utilize loot boxes.”211 However, while also warning about
the risk to its business if Apple adopted “more onerous”
requirements, there was also the added risk that various
jurisdictions212 were reviewing “the legality of loot boxes and
Id.
Facebook, Inc., First Quarter 2018 Results Conference Call
(Transcript) 8 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investorevents/event-details/2018/Facebook-Q1-2018-Earnings/default.aspx.
209 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 26, 2018).
210 Id.
211 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Mar. 9, 2018).
212 See id. (discussing stringent jurisdictions such as Australia, Belgium,
207
208
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whether they constitute gambling.”213 In particular, if other
jurisdictions determine that loot boxes “constitute gambling
or they otherwise elect to regulate the use of loot boxes, it
could require [these companies] to stop utilizing loot boxes
within [their] games that are distributed in such territories,
which would negatively impact [their] revenues.”214
Fourth, the influence of regulatory action concerning
mobile platforms, and the consequences for app companies,
was also a feature of the SEC filings. For example, COPPA
requires companies to obtain parental consent before
collecting personal information from children under the age
of 13.215 Glu Mobile Inc. discussed the FTC’s settlement with
Apple Inc. in 2014 related to in-app purchases made by
minors; and in 2016, the FTC’s successful lawsuit against
Amazon.com Inc., with a Federal District Court granting
summary judgment in favor of the FTC, finding Amazon
liable for unfairly billing consumers for unauthorized in-app
purchases by minors.216 Glu Mobile Inc. stated that “if [it
does] not follow existing laws and regulations, as well as the
rules of the smartphone platform operators, concerning
privacy-related matters, or if consumers raise any concerns
about [its] privacy practices, even if unfounded, it could
damage [its] reputation and operating results.”217
Finally, we found a number of remaining issues
related to privacy regulations that were highlighted in the
SEC filings. These included (a) warnings that the application
of privacy and data protection laws are often being “unclear,”
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the states of Hawaii and
Washington).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2000).
216 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20–21 (Mar. 9, 2018); see
also FTC v. Amazon Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55569, at *1–25 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2016).
217 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Mar. 9, 2018).
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with “conflicting” interpretations and applications;218 (b)
companies explicitly stating that they are “bound by our
public-facing privacy statement,” which “sets forth the ways
in which we collect, use and share information”;219 (c) risks
associated with proposed legislation, such as the E.U.’s
proposed e-Privacy Regulation,220 which will “notably”
amend the “rules on the use of cookies”;221 (d) COPPA,222 with
companies such as Zynga Inc. disclosing that compliance
involves “significant operational resources” and “significant
expenses”;223 and (e) the reliance some companies have on the
international transfer of personal information, such as
Twitter Inc. disclosing its reliance “on a variety of legal bases
to transfer certain personal information outside of the
European Economic Area,”224 including the E.U.-U.S. Privacy
Shield,225 and E.U. Standard Contractual Clauses.226

Id. (“[I]nterpreting and applying data protection laws to the mobile
gaming industry is often unclear. These laws may be interpreted and
applied in conflicting ways from state to state, country to country, or
region to region, and in a manner that is not consistent with our current
data protection practices.”).
219 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23 (Feb. 26, 2018).
220 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Mar. 1, 2018).
221 Id.
222 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2012).
223 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Feb. 20, 2018).
224 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 23, 2018).
225 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, of 12 July 2016
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 1 (EU).
226 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 23, 2018).
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III. MOBILE DEPENDENCIES AND PRIVACY
A. The Value of SEC Filings
First, our findings suggest that in order to understand the
actual impact of a change to a mobile platform’s data privacy
governance, whether imposed by a platform as a result of a
policy decision, or as a direct or indirect result of data privacy
regulations, SEC filings can provide evidence of the specific
impact on a company’s business model and data collection
practices. Some of the most significant impacts highlighted
in the findings included the impact on Twitter Inc. following
Apple Inc.’s introduction of allowing mobile users to prevent
cross-site tracking, resulting in a decrease of 2 million
monthly average users accessing Twitter through third-party
applications.227 Further, the impact of the change for a major
mobile advertising company was quantified as having had a
“net negative impact” on revenue in the third and fourth
quarters of 2017 of “$1.0 million and $25 million.”228
Second, the SEC findings can also demonstrate
whether a privacy governance change may not be
considerably effective. For example, app companies recognize
the trend of mobile platform software “increasingly”
containing features that “allow device users to disable
functionality that allows for the delivery of advertising on
their devices,”229 such as Apple’s Limit Ad Tracking,230 and
Id. at 18.
Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 81 (Mar. 1, 2018).
229 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018).
230 iPhone User Guide For iOS 6.1 Software, APPLE, INC., 134 (2013),
https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1658/en_US/iphone
_ios6_user_guide.pdf (“Restrict or reset Ad Tracking: Go to Settings >
General > About > Advertising. Turn on Limit Ad Tracking to prevent
apps from accessing your iPhone’s advertising identifier. For more
information, tap Learn More.”).
227
228
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Reset Advertising Identifier control introduced in iOS 6.231
However, SEC disclosures reveal difficulties with such
mechanisms, with one company noting that while the Limit
Ad Tracking is a signal that is sent by particular mobile
devices when a user chooses to send such a signal, “there is
no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon
receiving such a signal.”232 Further, SEC disclosures can
indicate that users choosing to turn these controls on may be
low, and only if users “elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms
in greater numbers, [companies’] ability to deliver effective
advertising campaigns on behalf of [their] advertisers would
suffer.”233 Thus, effectiveness of certain privacy enhancing
controls introduced by mobile platforms can be assessed from
SEC disclosures, in particular in how such controls may
affect an app company’s business. This also raises the issue
of circumventing mobile platforms controls, and it should be
remembered that in 2012, “Google Inc. . . . agreed to pay a
record $22.5 million civil penalty to settle [FTC] charges that
it misrepresented to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet
browser that it would not place tracking ‘cookies’ or serve
targeted ads to those users.”234
iOS SDK Release Notes for iOS 6.1, APPLE, INC. (Jan. 28, 2013),
https://developer.apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/General/RNiOSSDK-6_1/index.html.
232 Sito Mobile, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Apr. 2, 2018)
(“[C]ertain mobile devices allow users to ‘Limit Ad Tracking’ on their
devices. Like ‘Do Not Track,’ ‘Limit Ad Tracking’ is a signal that is sent
by particular mobile devices when a user chooses to send such a signal.
While there is no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon
receiving such a signal, it is possible that customers, sellers, regulators,
or future legislation may dictate a response that would limit our access
to data, and consequently negatively impact the effectiveness of our
solution and the value of our services on mobile devices.”).
233 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018).
234 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to
Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of
Apple's Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news231
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Third, we found evidence that SEC filings tend to
reveal more contextual information concerning a company’s
use of personal information, in particular relating to how
data is monetized, than the information contained in a
company’s privacy policy. For example, Twitter Inc.’s user
“Interest Graph,” Facebook Inc.’s “Social Context,” or
Pandora Media Inc.’s “Pandora Audience Targeting,” which
each company highlights to investors, are not specifically
mentioned in company privacy policies.235 In relation to its
“Interest Graph,” Twitter Inc. emphasizes how it “produces a
clear and real-time signal of a user’s interests, greatly
enhancing the relevance of the ads [it] can display for users
and enhancing [its] targeting capabilities for advertisers.”236
On the other hand, Twitter Inc.’s privacy policy states that it
may “make inferences like what topics you may be interested
in. . . and personalize the content [it] show[s customers],
including ads.”237 In a similar vein, Facebook Inc. emphasizes
its real-name policy to investors,238 stating that as “authentic
identity is core to the user experience on Facebook and users
generally share information that reflects their real interests
and demographics, [Facebook is] able to deliver ads that
reach the intended audience with higher accuracy rates
compared to online industry averages.”239 In its privacy
policy, Facebook Inc. merely states that it does not “share
information that personally identifies you,” such as a name,
events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftccharges-it-misrepresented.
235 See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, INC. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.
facebook.com/about/privacy/; see also Pandora Privacy Policy, PANDORA
MEDIA, INC. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.pandora.com/privacy; Twitter
Privacy Policy, TWITTER, INC. (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com
/en/privacy.
236 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 23, 2018).
237 See Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 235.
238 Osofsky & Gage, supra note 94.
239 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).
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with “advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless
you give [Facebook] permission.”240 In 2015, Facebook Inc.
explained that its real-name policy was designed to make
users “more accountable,” and prevent bullying, anonymous
harassment, scamming and criminal behavior.241
Fourth, our study shows that SEC disclosures may
reveal information not included in privacy policies, such as a
company’s concerns over a mobile platform simplifying the
process for users to opt out of behavioral targeting, and
should “users elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms in
greater numbers, our ability to deliver effective advertising
campaigns on behalf of our advertisers would suffer, which
could cause our business, financial condition, or results of
operations to suffer.”242 Similarly, a mobile app company’s
SEC disclosures may reveal specific information cornering
problematic data analytics software used, such as Glu Mobile
Inc.’s concern over Facebook prohibiting the HasOffers
software development kit, which “[it] had incorporated into
[its] games to track advertising metrics,” and “any similar
changes or prohibitions in the future could negatively impact
[its] revenue or otherwise materially harm [its] business, and
[Glu Mobile] may not receive significant or any advance
warning of such changes.”243
Fifth, SEC disclosures include previous and ongoing
regulatory action concerning privacy issues, which may not
be included in a company’s privacy policy. As such, SEC
disclosures are an interesting source of information for
privacy law and policy research, providing references to
regulatory issues and past and ongoing litigation. For
example, Snap Inc. discloses in its SEC filings that the FTC
Data Policy, FACEBOOK, INC. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook.
com/about/privacy/.
241 Osofsky & Gage, supra note 94.
242 Zynga, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 40 (Oct. 31, 2017).
243 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23–24 (Feb. 28, 2017).
240
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issued a final order in 2014, requiring Snap Inc. to “establish
a robust privacy program to govern how [it] treat[s] user
data,” and “complete bi-annual independent privacy audits,”
under the 20-year order.244 Snap Inc. also discloses how it
entered a 10-year assurance of discontinuance with the
Attorney General of Maryland implementing similar privacy
practices, including measures to prevent minors under the
age of 13 from creating accounts.245 The FTC complaint
included that Snap Inc. misrepresented its data collection
practices, and Snapchat transmitted geolocation information
from users of its Android app, despite saying in its privacy
policy that it did not track or access such information.246
Snapchat collected iOS users’ contacts information from their
address books without notice or consent.247 Snapchat
continued to collect this information without notifying or
obtaining users’ consent until Apple modified its operating
system to provide such notice with the introduction of iOS
6.248 An open question is whether consumers should also be
made aware that a company is subject to a 20-year FTC
order, and subject to bi-annual privacy audits. This question
also raises a point directly related to platform governance:
the effect mobile platform changes have in terms of ending
certain data collection practices that may later lead to
Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 22, 2018).
Id.
246 Complaint at 5, In re Snapchat, Inc., (F.T.C. No. 132-3078), 2014 WL
7495798 at *3.
247 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges
That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchatsettles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were.
248 Id.; see also What’s New in iOS 6.0, APPLE, INC., https://developer.
apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/General/WhatsNewIniOS/
Articles/iOS6.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40011812-SW7 (describing the
changes made in relation to data privacy in iOS 6) (last visited Oct. 18,
2018).
244
245
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regulatory action.
The Snap Inc. example is quite illustrative: the FTC’s
complaint stated that prior to September 2012, the Snapchat
app collected “not only the phone number a user enters, but
also, without informing the user, the names and phone
numbers of all the contacts in the user’s mobile device
address book.”249 Thus, the changes Apple Inc. made in
September 2012 to its operating system in iOS 6 had a direct
effect on the Snap Inc.’s data collection methods, two years
before the FTC’s final order was adopted.250 In iOS 6, the
operating system required a user’s permission before
allowing third-party apps access a mobile device’s contacts,
calendars, reminders, photo library, and location data.251
B. Regulating Business-to-Platform Relations
What is the appropriate legal and regulatory response to the
growing dependencies of business on mobile platforms?
While discussion of this question goes beyond the scope of
this Article and will be explored in depth in future work, the
European Commission has recently considered the
possibility of E.U. regulatory action concerning business-toplatform relations, and noted that “many small” and “some
larger” European businesses have “come to depend on
platforms,” including app stores, that provide “easy access to
customers and markets.”252
Complaint at 6, In re Snapchat, Inc., (F.T.C. No. 132-3078), 2014 WL
7495798 at *4.
250 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order
Settling Charges Against Snapchat (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-approves-final-order-settlingcharges-against-snapchat.
251 What’s New in iOS 6.0, APPLE, INC., https://developer.apple.com/
library/archive/releasenotes/General/WhatsNewIniOS/Articles/iOS6.ht
ml#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40011812-SW7 (last updated June 6, 2017).
252 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 5.
249
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The European Commission described this dependency
as entailing an “imbalance of bargaining power,” which may
give “scope for unfair behaviour” by platforms.253 Following
fact-finding by the European Commission in the form of
stakeholder workshops,254 and an industry survey,255 the
Commission indicated that “some” online platforms engage
in “harmful trading practices to the detriment of their
business users,” and identified six issues: (i) nonnegotiability of terms and conditions, which may be changed
unilaterally and unannounced; (ii) removal of products or
services, including unilateral account suspensions without
prior notice,256 and lack of appeal or statement of reasons;
(iii) lack of transparency of platforms’ practices, notably
concerning search and ranking and advertising placements;
(iv) platforms may favor their own products or services, or
discriminate between different third-party suppliers and
sellers, including tying business users to the platforms'
exclusive auxiliary services (e.g. payment services or
Id.
See e.g., Report of an Engagement Workshop Hosted by the European
Commission, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 19, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digitalsingle-market/en/news/data-related-aspects-business-platform-tradingpractices-workshop-report (discussing the findings of a workshop
organized under Chatham House rule to discuss specific issues related to
trading practices between online platforms and their business users).
255 Commission Consultation on What is Your Experience in Trading on
Online Platforms?, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 7, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/news/what-your-experience-trading-onlineplatforms (“All provided information and data will be treated as strictly
confidential.”). See Online Platform Environment, supra note 5
(discussing the results of the survey).
256 See Nicolas Jaimes, Datas de géolocalisation: Apple éjecte plusieurs
médias français de l'App Store [Geolocation Data: Apple Ejects Multiple
French Media from the App Store], LE JOURNAL DU NET, (Apr. 15, 2018,
2:21 PM) (Fr.) (explaining that a number of French news media apps were
removed from the App Store in April 2018 for transmitting user location
data to third parties without explicit consent).
253
254
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advertising exchanges); (v) business users may lack access to,
or the ability to transmit or port, certain types of data, both
of a personal and non-personal character (e.g. no access to
customer contact details, or contractually limited in their
ability to use data generated through a specific platform);
and (vi) no meaningful or effective redress.257 The
Commission argues that because of business users’
increasing dependency on online platforms to reach markets,
these platform practices can have “significant direct negative
effects” on many European businesses.258 This may lead to
disengagement from online platforms, hamper the ability to
reach markets, indirectly harm consumers by limiting
product and service choice, and could have significant
negative effects on the wider platform ecosystem, including
potential new entrant platforms.
Further, in April 2018, the European Commission
published a proposal for an E.U. regulation on fairness and
transparency for business users of online intermediation
services.259 The proposal seeks to cover app stores, and
includes rules on terms and conditions, suspension and
termination, ranking, differentiated treatment, complaint
handling, and codes of conduct.260 Notably, Article 7 of the
Regulation concerns access to data, and provides that mobile
platforms must provide business users with a description of
the technical and contractual access to any personal data or
other data which consumers provide for the user of the mobile
platform, or which is generated through mobile platforms.261
The European Commission considered that providing “a
single, more far-reaching data sharing obligation,” was
Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 5.
Id.
259 See supra note 44.
260 See id. at arts. 3–6, 9–11.
261 See id. at art. 7.
257
258
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“judged to be disproportionate.”262 In light of this possible
legislative action, SEC disclosures can provide additional
empirical evidence of such dependencies.
CONCLUSION
In 2011, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued
guidance on disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity
risks and cyber incidents, given the “increasing dependence”
of public companies on “digital technologies.”263 Because this
dependence increased, the risks to public companies
associated with cybersecurity also increased, resulting in
more frequent and severe cyber incidents, prompting the
SEC to issue the guidance.264 This has been followed by
further SEC guidance in 2018 on cybersecurity disclosures.265
One may argue that, as demonstrated in our SEC filings
study, there is now a similar “dependence” of many of the
largest public companies not only on digital technologies, but
also on user data and mobile platforms.266 Indeed, the SEC
Chairman recently acknowledged that “data collection,
storage, analysis, availability[,] and protection. . . have
become fundamental to the function and performance of our
capital markets, [and] the individuals and entities that
participate in those markets.”267 Given this dependence, the
growing business impact of data privacy rules, and in light of
recent data privacy scandals involving the standards for apps
to access data through online platforms, one may expect the
SEC to heighten its scrutiny of or even consider issuing
Id. at 8.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., CF DISCLOSURES GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2
CYBERSECURITY (2011).
264 Id.
265 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT AND GUIDANCE ON
PUBLIC COMPANY CYBERSECURITY DISCLOSURES (2018).
266 See discussion supra Part I.C.
267 Clayton, supra note 13.
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guidance on user data and privacy-related disclosures in the
future. While there was a concern that detailed disclosures
“could compromise cybersecurity efforts,”268 no such concerns
would be applicable to data protection disclosures.
Second, while the Article demonstrates that apps have
a considerable dependence on mobile platforms for the
collection and use of data,269 this may not necessarily be a
bad thing from a user privacy perspective. Because of the
control mobile platforms exercise over access to and
monetization of user data, regulatory action taken by or
targeted at mobile platforms may be quite effective (e.g. FTC
settlement with Apple Inc. over in-app purchases by
children). Further, where a mobile platform adopts a policy
change in favor of user privacy (e.g. Apple Inc.’s iOS 6), the
impact on the app ecosystem is quite pronounced. In contrast,
the European Commission has suggested as a policy option
of developing “rules on data access and use” to benefit
companies dependent on online platforms,270 to address the
concern that “business users to some extent lack access to
and/or the ability to transmit or port certain types of data,
both of a personal and non-personal character.”271 This
included “targeted marketing initiatives,” and the “ability to
use data generated through a specific platform to improve
their activities on other platforms.”272 However, the
European Commission recognizes that “the possible increase
in transmissions of personal data between different
controllers (platforms and business users) must be assessed”
in light of data protection regulation.273 While this approach
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., CF DISCLOSURES GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2
CYBERSECURITY (2011).
269 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 5.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
268
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of increasing the “transmissions” of data would address the
potential anti-competitive effects of dependencies on mobile
platforms, it could also increase the risks to data privacy. In
other words, policy makers will have to address the same
dilemma as faced by the platforms themselves: balancing the
interests of data-driven businesses, while reducing the risk
to mobile users’ privacy.
Finally, while the primary purpose of this Article was
to explore evidence of the dependence of mobile apps on
mobile platforms for the collection, use and monetization of
personal information, the Article also demonstrates that SEC
filings are a rich and fertile ground for privacy research more
generally. In light of the size and specific organization of SEC
filings, they may be an interesting source of information for
automated text analysis of privacy issues and developments.
Future research could also broaden the scope of the inquiry
to examine mobile advertising companies, mobile data
analytics companies, and the securities filings of public
companies in other jurisdictions.
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